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The recent events in Ukraine have made the world hold its 
breath. It obviously highlighted the fact that current international 
relations are undergoing deep changes, and that Russian ambitions 
concerning creation of a big and influential state are reviving. What 
is more, neither Europe nor United States are prepared or have the 
determination to respond to such actions undertaken by Russia. The 
unrest in Ukraine is also a turning point for this country itself. It can 
be a fresh start in their way towards Europe and European Union. 
The first attempt to liberate Ukraine form Russian influence was 
undertaken by Ukrainians at the turn of 2004 and 2005. Unfortu-
nately, the so called “Orange Revolution” did not bring the intended 
results. After Victor Yanukovych took the presidency in 2010, it 
was predictable that Ukraine would be gravitating towards Russia 
rather than European Union. The decision to reject the agreement 
negotiated by Ukraine with the European Union was the source of 
domestic conflict in Ukraine, which resulted in Yanukovych’s aban-
doning Ukraine, the change of government, and ultimately, losing 
Anna Kobierecka104
Crimea to Russia. The instability visible in Ukraine is a threat not 
only for its own security, but could also result in destabilization in 
Eastern Europe or even on the whole continent.
All these events drew the attention of Europe and United States. 
The reactions of various states differed substantially, mostly due 
to diversified interests of the states within the region of Eastern 
Europe and Russia. In this article, the main interest will be focused 
on the case of Sweden and its reaction to the Ukrainian crisis. The 
reaction of this particular state is relevant mostly due to its close 
vicinity to Russia and its concerns over eventual further Russian 
aggression. What is more, although being a traditionally neutral 
state, Sweden is active in the field of international relations. There-
fore, in case of significant events such as those in Ukraine, Swed-
ish political leaders express their standpoint instead of remaining 
uncommitted. Sweden recently has been considered as third in the 
European Union’s ranking of most influential countries in foreign 
policy and is a leader especially in aid contributions and defend-
ing human rights in Russia and Ukraine. Sweden turned out to be 
the leader in assisting the European Commission in suppressing 
Russia in its aggressive policy towards Eastern European coun-
tries. Sweden is also ranked third together with Germany among 
most impactful European states (Sweden equals Germany in EU for-
eign policy sway). Questions arise then: what influences the state’s 
standpoint in foreign policy? what shapes its views on certain cri-
sis? what are the actual possibilities of state’s reactions such as 
introducing sanctions and what motivates the state to undertake 
certain actions? Therefore, it is worth considering whether actions 
undertaken by third side states are successful or have symbolic 
overtone only. The main hypothesis to be investigated is that Ukrai-
nian crisis may have influenced the Swedish perception of Euro-
pean security and its own security aspects, especially in the context 
of NATO full participation.
The article is divided in two fundamental parts. First one is 
dedicated to the Ukrainian crisis itself. The most significant stages 
of the conflict are highlighted in this part with respect of inter-
national reactions and engagement in solving the crisis. Second 
part is dedicated to the core analysis concerning Swedish reaction 
to Ukrainian and Crimean crisis. Certain stages in the Swedish 
standpoint towards Russian engagement are visible in the analysis 
as well as shift in perceiving European security and Swedish atti-
tude towards NATO and the general condition of Swedish militaries 
and defense capacities.
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The research was based on the analysis of media and press re-
ports occurring together with current events in Ukraine and Russia. 
This resulted naturally in conducting the research with the use of 
an interpretativist paradigm which allowed to interpret statements 
of the most important Swedish, Ukrainian, Russian and other Eu-
ropean politicians. This paradigm was especially useful for follow-
ing reactions of policy makers and changes in attitude towards the 
Ukrainian events. Relying on Swedish and international press ar-
ticles all the needed data has been collected and analyzed. This led 
to certain conclusions concerning the reasons for such Swedish 
reactions and the background and context of Swedish anxieties 
concerning Russian intentions in the field of international relations 
and possible future steps heading towards further annexations.
Ukrainian Crisis
The Ukrainian society, at least this living in the western part 
of the country, for some time is visibly striving for integration with 
the European Union, mostly with hope of better economic and po-
litical condition as well as the warranty of democracy and liberty. 
Ukrainians assess their potential cooperation with European Union 
as more profitable than further coordination with Russia hoping for 
cheap loans and stock supplies. Meanwhile, President Yanukovych 
was much closer to Russia in his political views and aspirations. 
Therefore, the assumption that this oppositional expectations could 
result in a clash was very credible. In fact, Yanukovych’s rejection 
of signing the Ukraine – European Union agreement on trade and 
cooperation caused the outburst (Grytsenko). His decision was mo-
tivated by Russian threat of limited deliveries of oil, gas, and other 
supplies (EU door still open for Ukraine: Swedish MEP). What is 
more, Yanukovych was politically dependent on Russia, which is 
supporting him and his regime.
The events began in November 2013 when the signature of 
an association agreement between Ukraine and European Union 
turned out to be endangered. Documents were supposed to be 
signed during the Eastern Partnership Summit but the Ukrainian 
side decided to withdraw. That was the reason why the first protest-
ers appeared in Maidan demanding that the Ukrainian president 
sign the agreement (Kryzys Ukraiński). The probable reason for 
withdrawing from signing the agreement were the presumed losses 
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in Ukrainian-Russian trade, which were higher than potential prof-
its from economic cooperation with European Union. It was obvi-
ous that the Russian reaction to this would result in a reluctance 
towards a new Ukrainian policy aimed at Western and European 
Integration.
Protest grew in strength rapidly spreading around the country, 
however, the epicenter of demonstrations remained in Kiev. Pro-
testers demanded the immediate signage of the agreement and for 
keeping Ukraine on the pro-European course. After several days of 
silence, Yanukovych finally gave a statement on the 26th of Novem-
ber, in which he insisted that Ukraine is still heading towards the 
European Union and that he would do nothing that would stay in 
conflict with the society’s will and expectations (Kryzys Ukraiński). 
The situation changed dramatically on the 30th of November, when 
the manifestation was dispersed by Ukrainian police. It was a turn-
ing point when pro-European manifestations changed into anti-
governmental ones.
At first, the protesters refused to undertake negotiations with 
the authorities. All the proposals of organizing a round table ad-
dressed to the opposition were rejected until the 9th of December, 
when Vitali Klitschko expressed on behalf of his oppositional Ukrai-
nian Democratic Alliance for Reform party readiness to negotiate. 
Four days later the talks were terminated after Yanukovych turned 
down all oppositional demands, among others signing the Ukraini-
an-European Union agreement and government’s resignation. 
Further confrontations between the protesters and the police 
took place in January. Authorities took actions towards tighten-
ing regulations concerning the functioning of the opposition that 
exacerbated the situation. There were some suggesting the intro-
duction of martial law, however, officially the government claimed 
there were no such plans. It was during this time that the first 
casualties were reported. As a result, the United States announced 
the introduction of sanctions with the annulment of some Ukrai-
nian officials’ visas. Russia was removed from the G8 as evidence 
of the disapproval of United States and its allies towards Crimea’s 
annexation (Smale, Shear). Also, NATO decided to suspend its prac-
tical cooperation with Russia in protest against Russian behavior 
towards Crimea (Croft, Siebold). A proposition from the authorities 
to include opposition into the government was turned down as Ya-
nukovich refused to answer to the protesters’ demands concern-
ing, among others, reinstalling the constitution and withdrawing 
severe anti-protest laws (Polityuk, Zinets). Although Klitschko called 
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protesters to suspend their fights with Berkut, aggression still re-
mained between the two sides (Rozejm na Maidanie). At the end of 
January the protests remained intensive, and therefore, the au-
thorities were forced to yield some points. Laws limiting the opposi-
tion’s activity were canceled and amnesty was announced (Kryzys 
Ukraiński). The situation changed rapidly from ordinary protests 
concerning the refusal to sign the above mentioned agreement into 
a widespread protest against the regime.
At the beginning of February, the European Parliament passed 
a resolution concerning the situation in Ukraine. It exhorted 
to searching for political solution of the conflict and announced 
financial support for Ukraine. During the night of the 20th–21st of 
February, President Yanukovych negotiated with opposition with 
the assistance of Polish, German, and French foreign ministers 
(Nocne negocjacje. Opozycja na rozmowach z Janukowyczem). Af-
ter several rounds of negotiations Yanukovych agreed to earlier 
presidential elections, the re-enactment of the 2004 constitution, 
and the creation of national unity government. After talks with 
Yanukovych, foreign negotiators started the meeting with the op-
position (Po spotkaniu Janukowycza z szefami dyplomacji Polski, 
Francji i Niemiec czas na rozmowy z opozycją). Meanwhile, the un-
rest escalated when police decided to deploy snipers and use live 
ammunition against the protesters (Tranvor). According to official 
data, 82 people were killed and 622 were injured of which 405 
were hospitalized. Yanukovych, who has been accused for being 
responsible for killing massive civilians tried to escape to Russia 
(Po spotkaniu Janukowycza z szefami dyplomacji Polski, Francji 
i Niemiec czas na rozmowy z opozycją). In spite of his flight from 
the country, Yanukovych in his official statement voiced his opinion 
that he still was the Ukrainian President and highlighted the illegal 
character of the Ukrainian political revolution and the presidential 
elections planned for the 25th of May (Janukovych twierdzi, że jest 
prezydentem).
After removing Yanukovych from his position new temporary 
government was created. One of the leaders of oppositional Bat-
kivshchyna – Arsenij Yatsenyuk – was chosen to be the new prime 
minister and Andrii Deshchytsia as Minister of Foreign Affairs, who 
previously worked as an ambassador in Finland (Ukraina ma rząd. 
Jaceniuk premierem). Yatsenyuk was one of the Maidan Nezalezh-
nosti’s leaders, who signed the agreement negotiated by Radosław 
Sikorski – Polish Foreign Minister and Frank Walter Steinmeier – 
German Foreign Minister (Wachnicki). The composition of the new 
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government has been announced in Maidan, which had a symbolic 
tone (Nowy rząd Ukrainy). That is the place, where all the events 
started and where ordinary people fought for European integra-
tion and their political rights. The new Ukrainian Prime Minister 
was controversial due to his past. He reached senior positions in 
Ukraine owing to his good relations with Ukrainian oligarchs. He 
worked for Victor Pinchuk, son in law of the former Ukrainian Pres-
ident – Leonid Kuczma. In spite of being in favor of Orange Revolu-
tion in 2004, many perceive him as being dependent on Ukrainian 
establishment (Wachnicki). On the other hand, it is hard to find 
a politician in Ukraine, who has no bonds with influential Ukrai-
nian businessmen. Therefore, such a past should not be disqualify-
ing. Yatsenyuk announced that in his policy, European integration 
and signing the Ukrainian-European Union agreement would be 
priorities. At the same time, he highlighted that after taking the 
post, he would concentrate on fighting the risk of bankruptcy by 
introducing severe financial cutbacks (Ukraina ma rząd).
At the end of February, the first signs of separatist tendencies 
in Crimea appeared. Approximately 60% of Crimea’s population is 
of Russian origin, while only 25% are Ukrainians. The rest of the 
population are Tartars (Jest decyzja w sprawie referendum na Kry-
mie). Vladimir Konstantynov, chair of Crimea’s Highest Council, 
announced that secession is possible because of the unstable situ-
ation in Ukraine (Ukraina się rozpada? Krym chce się odłączyć). 
Armed forces representing the interests of the population of Crimea 
of Russian origin began to occupy main offices of Crimea’s authori-
ties and hoisted Russian flags. Afterwards, same troops have oc-
cupied civil airport in Sevastopol. It was presumed that those were 
Russian troops in spite of no clear markings on their uniforms. Due 
to the unstable situation, the Russian Federation Council gave its 
permission to use the Russian army in Crimea. The argument used 
to advocate such a decision based on the need to protect the health 
and life of Russian citizens in Crimea (Kryzys Ukraiński). Taking 
into consideration the disturbing information about the presence 
of possible Russian soldiers in Crimea, a group of OSCE observes 
was sent to Crimea in order to control the situation. However, 
they were stopped by unidentified men in military uniforms (OSCE 
observes barred from entering Crimea: Polish minister). Alongside 
the stoppage of OSCE observers, many cases of the harassment 
of journalists’ were registered. Also, a Swedish journalist and his 
cameraman were arrested by Russian militaries, who according 
to the journalist’s statement were aggressive and threatening. This 
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was just an example of such violations – many foreign journalists 
complained about being harassed by Russian militaries and hav-
ing their equipment stolen or confiscated (Swedish TV team freed 
by Russian military).
At the same time, Interfax announced that the Russian Black 
Sea Navy gave the Ukrainian army in Crimea an ultimatum, de-
manding that they surrender by the 4th of March at 05:00 under 
threat of using Russian forces to solve the Crimean problem. One 
of the scenarios taken into consideration is that such Russian be-
havior was just a way of escalating the problem through a show of 
strength. The fact is that Russian troops in small groups had been 
attacking Ukrainian soldiers for some time and most of the official 
bureaus had already been under Russian control.
Crimea’s parliament decided about organizing a referendum 
concerning the future of this autonomous territory. Initially, it was 
decided that it should take place on the 25th of May, but eventually 
was proceeded earlier – on the 16th of March. Tartar leader Refat 
Chubarov called for a boycott due to its illegal character (Brenner). 
Before conducting the referendum, a Crimean independence state-
ment was essential. The document has been adopted at an extraor-
dinary session of the parliament with the result of 78 out of 100 
members in favor of separating Crimea from Ukraine. The next step 
– referendum – paved the way for joining Russia (Crimea parliament 
declares independence from Ukraine ahead of referendum.). The doc-
ument was signed by the Chairman of Crimean Parliament Vladi-
mir Konstantynov and Chairman of Sevastopol City Council Yuriy 
Doynikov (Crimea parliament declares independence from Ukraine 
ahead of referendum). In the referendum more than 95% of voters 
expressed their support for Crimea’s joining Russian Federation 
(Crimea parliament declares independence from Ukraine ahead of 
referendum). Officially, Crimea became part of Russian Federation 
on the 18th of March, when Vladimir Putin signed a bill absorbing 
this territory into Russia (Ukraine crisis: Putin signs Russia-Crimea 
treaty.), but the Crimean parliament had voted to join the Russian 
Federation a day earlier (Morello, Englund). International reaction 
to this was a strong condemnation both in Europe and worldwide. 
A referendum was commented as illegal and against international 
law. Therefore, further sanctions were introduced, among others, 
travel bans and the freezing of assets.
There are broad consequences to Russia annexing Crimea. For 
Ukraine, it means losing a significant harbor in Sevastopol, mili-
tary units, and touristic important region. It also means an open 
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conflict with Russia. On the other hand, economically and political-
ly Ukraine can gain from this loss. Crimea was not a self-sufficient 
region and was dependent on Ukraine’s support: for example, in 
2013, Ukraine paid 17.7 million euro of subsidies (Kościński, Zasz-
towt). What is more, pro-European Ukraine will not be impeded by 
anti-European Crimea. For Russia, annexing Crimea meant desta-
bilization in the region and resulted in imposing sanctions. Most of 
the former Soviet Union’s satellite countries have a Russian minor-
ity within their societies. What is more, Russia has been widely con-
demned by the international community. Only a few states decided 
to recognize the annexation of Crimea – Afghanistan, Venezuela, 
and Syria (Wachnicki). The case of Ukraine and Crimea can be 
a warning for other countries that the same scenario can also apply 
to them. One of the repercussions of annexing Ukrainian territory 
by Russia is also the suspension of both military and civilian co-
operation with Russia within NATO. The decision was made on the 
1st of April at the level of foreign ministers (NATO stops military and 
civilian cooperation with Russia – NATO Council says). After Crimea, 
the unrest has spread into other Ukrainian regions. The eastern 
territories are mainly skeptical towards European integration and 
European Union itself. On the other hand, their bonds with Russia 
are much stronger.
Swedish Reaction in Media – Shift in European 
Security Perception
Sweden’s reaction to the events in Ukraine can be divided into 
several stages. The first comments occurred after the Ukrainian 
rejection of the agreement with the EU. The second phase con-
cerned the period of social unrest. The third phase began after Ya-
nukovych’s leaving the country when it seemed that the crisis was 
over. The last one began after occurrence of separatist tendencies 
in Crimea.
Swedish reaction to the Ukrainian crisis occurred immediately 
after the first signals concerning the protests on the streets. In De-
cember 2013, when social unrest was slowly spreading, the Swed-
ish Member of European Parliament Cecilia Wikström said that Eu-
rope cannot stay passive as being democracy’s and citizens’ rights 
guarantor (EU door still open for Ukraine: Swedish MEP). She also 
highlighted the fact, that for European states the support gained 
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from the EU together with all the economic, educational and social 
benefits is something obvious and undeniable. Ukrainian society 
wants the same. Therefore, the role of Europe is to provide further 
enlargements and extending the EU’s support on less developed 
countries (EU door still open for Ukraine: Swedish MEP). The sup-
port expressed by Sweden and its politicians is not surprising, given 
the fact that this country is famous for respecting its human and 
citizens’ rights as well as democratic principles in politics.
Until 22nd of February, when Yanukovych was removed from 
power by the Ukrainian parliament, the unrest was unceasing. 
Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt many times in his official state-
ments to the media accentuated that the Yanukovych’s regime is 
responsible for all the violence and its victims (Sweden pins violence 
on Ukrainian regime). The same sentiment was repeated in Febru-
ary, just before Yanukovych’s deposition. Carl Bildt pointed out that 
the Ukrainian parliament must be united in combating violence 
and repression towards civilians. At the same time, the Swedish 
Foreign Minister reaffirmed his total support for sanctions against 
the Ukrainian regime (Ukrainian president has blood on his hands: 
Bildt.). Together with American sanctions, Sweden also voiced its 
disapproval for Russian behavior. In 2013, Renault Trucks Defense, 
owned by Swedish truck manufacturer Volvo, signed a contract 
with Russian Uralvagonzavod concerning development of a com-
bat vehicle. However, the project was suspended as a result of the 
Russian annexation of Crimea (Volvo halts Russia tank plan over 
Ukraine crisis). 
At the same time, the Swedish prime minister emphasized that 
the Ukrainian situation was mostly a case of political and financial 
crisis. He expressed his worries concerning corruption and finan-
cial condition of Ukraine. Therefore, the role of Europe is to sup-
port Ukraine especially in those fields, while NATO should not be 
that much engaged in solving the crisis (Crimea not question for 
NATO: Sweden). What is more, Swedish politicians unequivocally 
stated that Russian engagement in Crimea and their actions head-
ing towards detaching the peninsula from Ukraine was an evident 
violation of international law and basic European principles of in-
ternational security. The most demonstrable evidence for Russian 
intervention in Crimea was voting in the Duma for deploying its 
troops there in case of such a necessity. As a way of expressing 
Swedish support for Ukraine, Carl Bildt joined other European for-
eign ministers at the beginning of March to discuss the crisis (Bildt: 
Russia is breaking the law in Ukraine).
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In spite of all positive attitude among Swedish politicians to-
wards Ukraine, one unfortunate statement has been noticed by 
press. During an official speech on 2nd of March, the Swedish prime 
minister said that Russian involvement in Crimea could be under-
stood due to the Russian majority living in this region. His state-
ment caused confusion in the Swedish media and forced the Swed-
ish prime minister to explain himself in Godmorron Sverige TV show 
(Swedish PM: Russian worries understandable). The probable expla-
nation for such an unfortunate statement is taking prime minister’s 
words out of context, which is the most frequent excuse for political 
incorrectness.
In March 2014, Russians started their large scale Baltic Sea 
training, which concentrated over 3,500 servicemen of Russian Bal-
tic Fleet in Kaliningrad (Sweden plays down Russian Baltic opera-
tion). The reception of such Russian activity widely distressed Eu-
rope. Organizing fleet training in the Baltic Sea has been perceived 
as a demonstration of power and potential Russian aggression in 
the case of more determined European reaction to Russian-Ukrai-
nian relations. A Swedish expert at the Swedish Defense Research 
Agency claimed that the whole operation has been planned in ad-
vance and it is probable that has nothing in common with current 
Ukrainian crisis (Sweden plays down Russian Baltic operation). 
On the other hand, it is undeniable that such training can be used 
as a mean of propaganda and intimidation of the opponents. Such 
behavior is also thought as typical for the former Soviet Union, 
which was treating the case of security as a zero sum game.
Swedish reaction to Rusian Baltic trainings, in spite of sugges-
tions that they should not be connected to the Ukrainian crisis, was 
explicit. Extra air defense had been sent to the island of Gotland. 
Swedish Armed Forces’ spokesman Göran Mårtensson highlighted 
that it was the state’s duty to send aircrafts to protect Swedish ter-
ritory and that constant monitoring of the situation in Ukraine was 
being conducted (Sweden sends jets to Baltic after Russian move). 
At the same time, the situation in Ukraine inspired a discussion 
among Swedish politicians concerning the condition of the Swed-
ish army, its defense strategy, and army reforms. Armed Forces 
Supreme Commander Sverker Göransson claimed that the Swed-
ish current strategy for building a professional army was success-
ful and did not need any improvements. On the other hand, Jan 
Björklund the Swedish Deputy Prime Minister outlined that Sweden 
should be able to defend Götland island and therefore needs to re-
think its own defense strategy (Swedish military rejects call for new 
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doctrine). Sweden plainly seems to be worried due to Russian inten-
tions towards Ukraine. Sweden fears potential Russian aggression 
in ex-Soviet states – Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Götland Island 
as an important strategic location may become a tidbit for Russia. 
The entire situation also exhorts Swedish politicians to reconsider 
the idea of becoming a NATO member, not only partner.
In accordance to Swedish concerns, their troops joined NATO 
training exercise in the vicinity to Russian border. 1,400 Swedish 
soldiers took part in the training in the northern parts of Norway. 
Sweden perceives the training as a great opportunity to improve 
defense, especially in the light of the Crimean situation. Swedish 
colonel Jan Mörtberg said that no one expected Russia to enter 
Crimea, therefore it is possible that it will go further to the Baltic 
States (Swedes train with NATO on Russian border). Although train-
ing was planned earlier, similarly to Russian training in the Baltic 
Sea, it can be perceived as a deterrence tool which may cool Rus-
sian intentions.
Alongside the military training exercises, both Russian and 
NATO’s, Crimea was prepared with the final date decided on the 
16th of March. The general international response was explicit – the 
voting would be considered illegal. Swedish foreign minister – Carl 
Bildt also stated that referendum conducted under the threat of us-
ing violence and presence of Russian troops cannot be considered 
as fair and consistent with Ukrainian or international law (Bildt: 
Crimea referendum illegal whatever result). Russian political influ-
ence on the Crimean crisis and conducting the referendum were ob-
vious and caused both international confusion and condemnation. 
Unfortunately, due to economic and trade links between states, 
there was no decided and explicit response to Russian behavior. 
The introduced sanctions and conducted diplomatic talks did not 
manage to restrain Russia from meddling with the Ukrainian inter-
nal situation. Together with the condemnation of Russian behav-
ior, the Swedish prime minister expressed his support for potential 
Ukrainian use of force against Russian troops and separatists in 
order to restore peace. What is more, he ensured that Sweden in 
alike situation would use all measures to ease the unrest (Sweden 
backs Ukraine to repel militias).
After the referendum in which Crimea’s population decided 
on separating from Ukraine and joining Russia, Sweden pledged 
a will to support financially new and democratic authorities in 
Kiev. Sweden together with Nordic and Baltic States expressed 
their readiness to help Ukraine. Anders Borg, Minister of Finance, 
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claimed that not only financial help is important, but it should also 
be supported with political reforms. The social unrest resulted in an 
economic crisis. In order to stabilize Ukrainian economy, Ukraine 
might need even up to $30–35 billion for all the required reforms 
and transformations (Sweden pledges urgent loans to Ukraine; Swe-
den backs bilateral aid to Ukraine). The Swedish prime minister 
together with other politicians hoped that their readiness to provide 
help for Ukraine would encourage other countries to do the same. 
It is characteristic for Sweden that in such situations ruling parties 
as well as oppositional ones speak with a united voice.
The crisis in Crimea results not only in mobilizing European 
countries in the context of political and financial support. Most of 
the countries feel the threat for international peace, and therefore 
most of them mobilize their forces and demonstrate readiness of 
undertaking adequate steps. A survey in Finland had been conduct-
ed concerning creating military union between Sweden and Finland. 
The union would assume the possibility of mobilizing armed forces 
of both countries in case of a threat or crisis situation. Over 50% of 
Finnish population supported such an idea, which shows that Eu-
rope recognizes the possible Russian threat (Majority of Finns back 
Swedish military union). What is more, neither Sweden nor Finland 
are NATO members and therefore must undertake actions in order 
to care for their interests and safety. Taking into consideration poor 
Swedish facilities to defend themselves, participation in collective 
defense organization becomes a more frequent subject in political 
discourse.
Sweden decided to take the role of an initiator in international 
relations. Sweden would like to inspire other nations and politi-
cians to undertake certain actions aimed at refraining Russia. After 
one of the foreign ministers’ meeting, Carl Bildt outlined that all 
the states should stay united in being firm on international law 
and all the rules, which Russia had violated explicitly by annexing 
Crimea (Bildt on Putin: What else is in his heart?). Sweden and the 
international community fear the possible furthering of Russian 
claims. Taking into consideration later probable Russian support 
for separatists in eastern Ukraine those fears do not seem to be un-
founded. The Swedish security service Säpo stated that Russia has 
intensified its espionage activity in Sweden and probably is includ-
ing war preparations. More evidence of Russia’s increased interest 
in Sweden has been conducted lately with simulated flight attacks 
on Swedish targets and attempts to recruit spies. This informa-
tion was presented in the Säpo annual intelligence assessment 
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(Russian plans for war on Sweden cause concern). Although the 
plans of a Russian attack on Sweden seem to be unlikely, it is not 
absolutely out of the question.
Sweden is becoming increasingly interested in joining NATO. 
Almost 30% of Swedes would support joining this organization in 
comparison to only 17% in 2013 (More Swedes want to join NATO). 
The survey had been conducted between October and December 
2013 when the crisis in Ukraine was not that intense yet, however 
the situation undoubtedly could have an impact on strengthen-
ing such attitude among Swedes. What is more, the current coali-
tion announced that in case of winning in the upcoming elections 
more funds would be allocated to the military. The budget would 
be increased by 5 billion kronor annually starting in 2015 (Sweden 
to beef up air force to counter Russia). This decision is a change in 
the contemporary Swedish defense policy. 15 years ago the authori-
ties decided on decreasing the military budget as no threat to Swe-
den had been recognized. Sweden as a neutral country did not see 
a need to foster its defense capabilities before, but the Ukrainian 
crisis showed that Sweden should enhance its defense capabilities 
bearing in mind the changing character of possible conflicts. In 
spite of taking precise steps aimed at ensuring Sweden’s safety, as 
for example signals concerning the increase in military expenses, 
and reacting to Russia’s behavior in relations with Ukraine, the rul-
ing coalition reached lowest level of voters support since its creation 
in 2004, which seems to be surprising (Government hits record low 
in voter support).
Conclusions
The Ukrainian crisis showed that in fact we do not live in safe 
and stable times. International relations seem to be unpredictable 
and not always rational. It also showed discord in certain states’ 
policies. The reactions of the international society seemed to be 
identical – Russian assistance for Ukrainian separatists has been 
condemned. But in fact the actual reactions differed substantially. 
The United States can be considered as most determined and firm 
in their reaction by applying sanctions on Russia. Mostly the reason 
for this is poor economic ties with Russia. The commerce between 
those two states is much less intense than between Germany or 
United Kingdom and Russia. Therefore, European countries decided 
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on taking a rather moderate attitude. Of course, some sanctions 
were introduced, however no categorical or forceful actions had 
been undertaken. It could even be said that politics and threats 
of undertaking more determined actions against Russia were only 
theater.
The Swedish reaction to the Ukrainian crisis was immediate. 
Similar to other western countries, Sweden condemned Russia and 
voiced its support for Ukrainian protesters. Apart from that, Sweden 
was one of the countries that were the first to propose diplomatic 
and financial support. What is more, it took action in the European 
Union arena to motivate other member countries to do the same. 
Swedish activity in this field is understandable. First of all, Sweden 
is in quite close vicinity to Russia. What is more, Swedish neigh-
bors – especially the Baltic States stay in natural and historical 
Russian interest zone. Therefore, the fear of further Russian claims 
does not lack justification. Russia’s behavior is an expression of 
power and strength in a Soviet style. It can mean that Russia will 
no longer respect international law or customs and will be marching 
further in their path towards regaining its old influential position 
of a world power state. Swedish interest in the Ukrainian situation 
and in deterring Russia is visible due to their poor military condi-
tion. Sweden would not be able to protect themselves only relying 
on their own army. For the same reason, Sweden would not be able 
to undertake any more determined actions against Russia. What 
is more, Sweden is not a NATO member and therefore, according 
to international regulations other countries, would not be obliged 
to protect it in case of aggression. Ukrainian crisis boosted the dis-
cussion concerning joining this organization and also changed the 
general social attitude towards this idea. In spite of the fact that the 
situation is becoming more stable, at least in terms of European 
ground, Sweden and other countries should stay alert. They have 
to take into consideration the scenario where international peace 
that lasts in Europe since the end of World War II may be breached.
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